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LESSONS FOR PATENT POLICY FROM EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON
PATENT LITIGATION
by
James Bessen*
Michael J. Meurer**
This Article reviews empirical patent litigation research to reveal patent
policy lessons. First, the Article presents facts about patent litigation.
Next, it analyzes the patent premium. Patent litigation research reveals
little about the magnitude of the patent premium, but the research reveals
the strategies firms use to capture the patent premium and the patent
policy instruments that determine the patent premium. Next, the Article
evaluates the patent prosecution process and notes that making efforts to
refine a patent application can affect the value of the patent. The Article
then identifies reforms for improving PTO performance. Finally, the
Article discusses policy changes that patent litigation research suggests
would improve procedural fairness and reduce patent litigation costs.
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INTRODUCTION

We explore lessons for patent policy that can be learned from empirical
research on patent litigation. After presenting some salient facts about patent
litigation, we turn first to analysis of the patent premium, the increment in
profit from invention that flows from the rights conferred by a patent grant.
Patent litigation research does not tell us much about the size of the premium,
but it does shed light on what strategies firms use to capture the premium and
what patent policy instruments determine the premium. Next, patent litigation
research helps us evaluate the patent prosecution process. Specifically, we
comment on the power of applicants to affect the value of a patent through their
efforts to refine their applications. We also comment on reforms that might
improve the performance of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Finally,
we discuss some policy changes that patent litigation research suggests might
improve procedural fairness and reduce the expected cost of patent litigation.
II. FACTS ABOUT PATENT LITIGATION

Patent litigation has been called the sport of kings; it is complex,
uncertain, and expensive.1 There is a significant risk that a patent will be
invalidated at trial,2 but that danger appears to be declining over time.3 There
also appears to be significant uncertainty about the scope of patent claims and
whether a particular defendant is infringing.4 For patent suits with less than $1
million at risk, the median estimated cost of discovery is $290,000 and the
median estimated total litigation cost is $500,000; for suits with $1–$25 million
at risk, the median estimated cost of discovery is $1 million and the median
estimated total litigation cost is $2 million; for suits with more than $25 million
at risk, the median estimated cost of discovery is $2.5 million and the median
estimated total litigation cost is $3.995 million.5
In 2000, the United States PTO granted about 180,000 patents. The same
year about 2,000 patent suits were filed involving about 3,000 patents.6 About

1
Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH. REV., Apr. 28, 2004, at
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/04/wo_kline042804.asp.
2
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (54% of patents were found valid in a population of
300 final validity decisions).
3
See id. at 206.
4
See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases? 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, Patent Cases] (“[D]istrict
court judges improperly construe patent claim terms in 33% of the cases appealed to the
Federal Circuit.”).
5
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2003, at
22 (2003).
6
KIMBERLY A. MOORE, WORTHLESS PATENTS 1–2 (George Mason Law & Econ.
Working Paper Series, No. 04-29, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=566941.
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4% of the patent suits that terminated in fiscal year 2000 reached trial.7 The
number of patent suits filed doubled over the decade of the 1990s, but the
number of cases terminating during or after trial has remained roughly
constant.8 Thus, the fraction of suits ending in trial declined. Nevertheless, the
fraction of patent cases that go to trial is still relatively high compared to civil
cases in general; only 1.9% of the federal civil cases terminated in the fiscal
year 2000 went to trial.9 The trend in filing of patent suits is similar to the trend
in trademark suits. In contrast, filing of copyright suits has been relatively flat,
and filing of antitrust and contract suits declined over the 1990s.10
Patent holders win slightly more than half of their cases.11 The 58% win
rate reported by Kimberly Moore in patent cases is less than the 64% win rate
achieved by corporate plaintiffs facing corporate defendants in contract cases.12
Interestingly, the win rate is sensitive to the presence of a jury. Juries are more
likely than judges to uphold patent validity,13 and patent owners are more likely
to win a suit tried to a jury than a suit tried to a judge. Outcomes are close to
fifty-fifty in patent cases tried before a judge.14
These data possibly reflect a growing burden from patent litigation: the
trial rate is double the average of federal civil litigation, patent trials are
especially expensive, and filings are increasing rapidly. Simple trial rates,
outcome measures, and trends in filing are not terribly informative, however,
about the normative impact of patent litigation. Thus, researchers engage in
more sophisticated analysis of patent litigation data. The following sections
review some of that analysis and connect it to patent policy issues.
Before we begin that review, we need to explain why simple litigation
statistics are hard to interpret and hard to link to policy analysis. The main
7

The estimate is based on cases reported to the Federal Judicial Center. We accessed
the data through the web site created by Cornell law professors Theodore Eisenberg and
Kevin M. Clermont. Of the 2221 patent cases that terminated in the 1999 fiscal year, 85
terminated during or after trial. THEODORE EISENBERG AND KEVIN M. CLERMONT, JUDICIAL
STATISTICAL INQUIRY FORM, at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm; see also
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 383 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Black Box] (noting that 6.9% of
patent suits go to trial).
8
EISENBERG AND CLERMONT, supra note 7, at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/
questata.htm.
9
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119, 136 (2002).
10
EISENBERG AND CLERMONT, supra note 7, at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/
questata.htm; see also Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or
May Not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 577, 590 (analyzing
the decline in contract litigation over the 1990s).
11
See Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 385 (the patentee won 58% of the cases). But
see Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are
Small Firms Handicapped? 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 59 (2004) (win rates are close to 50% in
patent cases).
12
See Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case
Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92, S103 (1997).
13
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 213.
14
Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 368.
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problem is that patent suits probably constitute a small and uncharacteristic
subset, drawn from the set of all patent disputes. Certainly, patent trials
constitute a small and uncharacteristic subset of filed patent suits. A selection
bias distorts inferences based on statistics like patent holder win rates at trial.
Similarly, a selection bias may distort inferences based on studies of patent
lawsuit filing.15
Proper interpretation of litigation statistics requires understanding why
patent disputes arise, why suits are filed, and why certain suits reach trial. To
illustrate, let us study the claim that the Federal Circuit is pro-patentee. Assume
the Federal Circuit has changed patent law in such a way that the set of patent
disputes has not changed and the probability of patentee victory at trial has
increased. If these assumptions were true, what would they imply for the
frequency of litigation and success of patent owners at trial? A naïve approach
would treat litigation as random and independent of patent and party
characteristics. Then the assumed actions of the Federal Circuit would not
change the frequency of litigation, but would increase the observed success rate
of patent holders.
By contrast, economists treat litigation as a bargaining failure and use
bargaining models to explain why certain disputes are “selected” for litigation.
Several models can be used for this purpose; most of our discussion focuses on
the simplest plausible model. According to the settlement cost model, firms
choose trial over settlement because the cost of settlement exceeds the cost of
trial.16 For most types of disputes, the settlement cost model is implausible
because trial costs typically far exceed settlement costs. In fact, this is probably
true of most patent disputes. But patent disputes can plausibly reverse the
inequality. Settlement costs may exceed trial costs because a valid patent
creates rights that occasionally translate into significant market power and
profit that cannot be duplicated through a settlement contract; in these cases
rational parties go to trial.
Consider an example of litigation concerning a patent on a chemical.17 The
chemical invention opens a new market, supplied by the patentee and a single
competitor. Suppose the competitor arguably infringes the patent and the
parties agree that the patentee has a probability p of winning at trial. Suppose
profit in the new market is $200 million if the patentee is a monopolist;
15
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 141 (discussing the refraction effect); Joel
Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of
Litigation, 41 J.L. ECON. 451, 458 (1998).
16
This model appears in Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20
RAND J. ECON. 77 (1989). The same article presents a private information model of a patent
settlement. The most common approach is the optimism model of patent settlement, which is
discussed for example in JEAN O. LANJOUW & JOSH LERNER, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE, (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6296, 1997), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6296.
This survey article focuses more on the economic literature and covers significant results not
discussed in this Article.
17
We think this model might be particularly appropriate when applied to
pharmaceuticals.
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alternatively, the total profit in the industry is $150 million if the competitor
competes against the patentee under a patent license, and total profit in the
industry is $80 million if the competitor competes against the patentee without
a license. Suppose that the cost of trial is $4 million to each party. If the parties
go to trial and the patentee wins, then each party pays their legal fees and the
patentee enjoys a $200 million monopoly. If the parties go to trial and the
competitor wins, then each party pays their legal fees and they each get $40
million in profit, which is half of the industry profit of $80 million (we assume
neither firm has an advantage and so competition leads them to split the
industry profit equally). The parties can avoid legal fees by agreeing to a
settlement license and dividing the industry profit of $150 million in a mutually
acceptable fashion.
Settlement costs arise implicitly in this example and lead to equilibrium
trial under certain conditions. Settlement is attractive to the parties in this
example because it avoids trial costs.18 But settlement is costly because it
sacrifices some of the monopoly profit available in the new product market (we
assume industry profit is $150 million rather than $200 million following
settlement). In other words, we assume the contract terms that regulate
competition in the duopoly market created by the settlement license do not fully
replicate the monopoly outcome. This assumption can be justified by assuming
antitrust law constrains the terms in the license or by assuming contracting
costs (usually attributed to informational problems) impede perfect
cartelization.
The outcome in this model depends on the probable outcome of trial. The
critical value of the probability of patentee success, p, in this model is 65%—at
that probability, the joint profit from settlement just equals the joint profit from
trial. The joint profit from settlement is constant at $150 million, and the joint
profit from trial is $200(.65) + $80(.35) – $4(2) = $150 million. If the
probability of patentee success is less than 65%, then parties will settle. The
division of industry profit achieved through the settlement license depends on
the strength of the patentee’s case.19 If p is greater than 90%, then the
competitor will be deterred from entering the market. The $4 million cost of a
trial exceeds the expected profit from trial, $40(1 – p). Finally, when the
probability of patentee success is between 65% and 90%, then trial occurs.20
This quick modeling exercise gets us to the point where we can discuss the
selection effect. Assume this model explains why patent suits go to trial, and
assume the effect of Federal Circuit decisions is to increase the probability that
18

Settlement is also attractive because it avoids a trial outcome that invalidates or
narrows the patent, which renders it ineffective as an entry barrier. Another possible
settlement agreement calls for the patentee to withdraw from the market and assign the
patent or exclusively license the patent to the competitor. Like the duopoly license, this
strategy may suffer from high settlement costs especially because of antitrust scrutiny.
19
If the parties split the bargaining surplus equally, then the patentee gets a share of the
industry profit equal to 75 + 100p, and the competitor gets 75 – 100p. In particular, the
parties share the industry profit equally if the patentee has no chance of winning at trial.
20
The expected profit to the patentee from litigation is 200p + 40(1 – p) – 4 = 36 +
160p. Notice the profit from trial equals the profit from settling at p = .65.
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a patentee wins a patent suit. What would that imply for observed win rates at
trial? The answer is not clear, but one possibility is that the observed win rate is
unchanged but the frequency of trial goes up. Notice this is quite different from
the naïve view that trial frequency would not change and the win rate would
rise. The win rate might be unchanged, because only disputes in which the
plaintiff’s probability of victory falls within the 65% to 90% range go to trial.
The assumed actions of the Federal Circuit do nothing to change that range.
The Federal Circuit’s actions move some disputes out of that range and other
disputes into that range, and the net effect is unclear.21
The essential message to draw from the foregoing discussion is that
interpretation of trial outcome data requires a model of litigation. It is quite
possible for the Federal Circuit to favor patentees without seeing win rates
change. Alternatively, it is quite possible that win rates could change without
the Federal Circuit or the PTO altering patent standards. The region of trial
outcomes in the settlement cost model are determined by factors like the rigor
of antitrust policy, the cost of trial, and the market value of inventions.
III. THE PATENT PREMIUM

A. The Magnitude of the Patent Premium

Economic theory and evidence present a strong case for subsidization of
R&D in some industries. R&D generates positive externalities and therefore, it
is underprovided by competitive markets. The patent system is one of the main
policy tools used to subsidize R&D.22 Various types of empirical research
provide evidence on the magnitude of the patent premium—the reward
inventors get from patenting their inventions. The research shows that patents
provide a significant effective subsidy of R&D, but one that is probably much
smaller than most patent lawyers would expect. Managers, on the other hand,
would not be surprised. Surveys of R&D managers reveal that firms have other,
often stronger, R&D incentives stemming from lead time advantage, learning,
complementary products, and secrecy.23

21
The following example would result in no change in the win rate and an increase in
the frequency of trial. Suppose that there are “good” patents with p = .7 and “bad” patent
with p = .3. If the Federal Circuit increases the share of good patents by 20%, then trial
frequency would increase by 20% and the win rate would be 70% before and after the
change.
22
Government funding of universities and research labs, research grants, R&D
contracts, and tax subsidies are the other main tools.
23
Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 784–85; WESLEY M.
COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND
WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper 7552, 2000); see also Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable
Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257–69 (2004).
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Following Schankerman,24 the ratio of the value of the patent stock to the
value of the R&D stock provides an upper bound estimate of the “equivalent
subsidy rate” for patent protection—that is, the subsidy that would be required
to induce firms to make the same expenditures on R&D if there were no patent
protection.25 This ratio is thus a measure of the incentive effect of patents after
taking other incentives into account. Several different types of studies provide
estimates of this ratio. Studies based on renewal rates of patents in European
countries find upper bound estimates of equivalent subsidy rates around 15%,
although with quite a large range of variation over industries.26 Survey data
provide estimates ranging from 11–17%, again with significant variation across
industries.27
Perhaps the most direct measures can be inferred from estimates of the
effect of patent stocks on the market value of firms.28 Since Griliches,
economists have run regressions to decompose the market value of firms into
separate contributions from physical capital, the stock of past R&D
expenditures, and the stock of accumulated patents.29 In general, these studies
usually find a small, but positive, contribution of patents to the value of the
firm above and beyond the contribution from R&D.
The most recent study in this line augments patent counts with citation
data and gets better estimates of the market value of U.S. manufacturing
firms.30 Interpreting their data at the sample mean, we find an upper bound
estimate of the equivalent subsidy rate of 12%; estimated at the sample median
this figure is 7%.31 Thus, consistent with the survey literature, patents generally
create a premium sufficient to cover a relatively small fraction of the cost of
R&D.
24
Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology
Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 95 (1998).
25
This is an upper bound estimate to the extent that there are diminishing returns to
R&D and already existing subsidies for R&D. Also, to the extent that some of a firm’s
patented inventions do not derive from R&D on its products and processes, the value of
patents overstates the subsidy.
26
See Schankerman, supra note 24; Jean O. Lanjouw et al., How to Count Patents and
Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS.
ECON. 405 (1998).
27
Estimates based on survey data of imitation costs suggest a figure of 11%; using a
novel data set that combines survey and quantitative data for U.S. firms renders a mean
estimate of 17%. ASHISH ARORA ET AL., R&D AND THE PATENT PREMIUM 29–30 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2004), http://papers.nber.org/papers/
w9431.
28
Estimates based on market value regressions have the advantage that they reflect
possible strategic interaction between firms. Estimates based on patent renewals assume that
the value of each patent is independent of other patents in the portfolio; this assumption may
be violated when firms pursue strategic uses of patent portfolios.
29
See Bronwyn H. Hall, Innovation and Market Value, in PRODUCTIVITY, INNOVATION
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 177 (Ray Barrell et al. eds., 2000) for a review of this
literature.
30
See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON.
(forthcoming 2005), http://www.iue.it/Personal/bhall/ HallJaffeTrajtenberg_RJEjan04.pdf .
31
Details of these calculations are available on request from the authors.
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The evidence on the patent premium presents a puzzle when contrasted
with popular accounts suggesting high and growing profits from patents.32 The
puzzle dissolves when we probe deeper into the nature of the patent premium.
First, it is important to recognize that, in absolute terms, the patent premium is
large; 12% of the 2002 non-Federally funded manufacturing sector R&D
expenditures amounts to about $12 billion.33 After taking account of the costs
of acquiring these patents, this is roughly equivalent to the value of federally
funded R&D performed by manufacturing firms ($10.7 billion). Second, the
value of patents varies sharply across inventions. In particular:
1. Patent values are highly skewed. Hall et al. find that a small number of
highly cited patents are responsible for a large share of the total value of
patents. Scherer and Harhoff review a variety of evidence on returns and
find that often the top 10% of patents (or innovations) account for 8090% of the total returns.34
2. The patent premium varies across industries. There is no consensus on
precise magnitudes, but most commentators believe the premium is large
in biotech and the pharmaceutical industry.35
3. Entrants earn a higher premium than incumbents. In a subsequent
study by Hall, using the same dataset, she found that in electronics,
machinery, instruments, and semiconductors the positive value of patent
stocks was largely limited to entrant firms, especially after 1984. In
aggregate, incumbent firms in those industries tended to have either no
significant value to their patent stocks or even a negative value.36
B. How Do Firms Use Patents to Capture the Patent Premium?

In the previous section, we did not cite any empirical research on patent
litigation in relation to the magnitude of the patent premium. Litigation
research is not well-suited to estimating that magnitude. Certainly, the expected
cost of litigation sets a lower bound on the expected value of litigated patents,
but that is not very helpful, because estimates of expected litigation costs are
hard to obtain, and it is not clear how close actual patent values are to the lower
bound.
32
See generally Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in
Intellectual Property, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 54.
33
Total manufacturing R&D spending in 2002 was $109 billion, of which $10.7 billion
was federally funded.
34
See Hall et al., supra note 30; F.M. Scherer & Dietmar Harhoff, Technology Policy
for a World of Skew-Distributed Outcomes, 29 RES. POL’Y 559 (2000); see also MOORE,
supra note 6, at 14, http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=566941 (53.7% of
U.S. patents expire for failure to pay maintenance fees).
35
See Levin et al., supra note 23; ARORA ET AL., supra note 27. Schankerman finds a
rather different pattern across French industries. Part of this he attributes to price controls
for pharmaceuticals; part may also be due to strategic effects. Schankerman, supra note 24,
at 77–107.
36
BRONWYN H. HALL, EXPLORING THE PATENT EXPLOSION sec. 3.3 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10605, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10605.
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In contrast, litigation research provides a valuable complement to other
types of research on the question of how firms capture the patent premium. For
example, evidence that firms in a particular industry have a high propensity to
litigate their patents might indicate that patents are particularly valuable in that
industry. Furthermore, litigation research reveals characteristics of patents and
patent holders that are especially likely to be involved in litigation. When
combined with survey, stock market, and patent renewal studies, these findings
paint a picture of the type of firm and type of invention that benefits most from
patent protection. Survey, stock market, and renewal studies have the
advantage of using data on all patentees, but they cannot provide information
about the identities of licensees or opposing parties in litigation. Naturally,
studies of litigation and licensing provide such information. These studies can
provide information about the characteristics of accused infringers and
licensees and the magnitudes of damage payments or license fees. Additionally,
litigation studies can provide information on the duration of a dispute, whether
infringement was judged to be willful, whether the defendant pursued an
independent research program, and whether attorney’s fees were shifted in
either direction.
1. Exclusion and Licensing of Competitors
Unlike many patent law commentators, we believe that the patent premium
ultimately derives entirely from the rights of exclusion created by the patent
grant. In other words, the patent premium flows from patent litigation or, more
typically, the threat of litigation.37 Thus, studies of patent litigation potentially
can reveal information about the nature of the patent premium. For example,
studies of litigation help discriminate how much of the patent premium flows
from three possible sources. The first source of profit from patents arises when
a patentee excludes competitors from practicing the patented invention or
forces competitors to take a license under threat of an infringement suit.38
Exclusion is a common practice in the pharmaceutical industry; and licensing
competitors is a common practice in the semi-conductor industry. A second
source arises when a patentee licenses or assigns the patent to a firm or firms
37
We are skeptical of the empirical significance of patent signaling, the use of patents
to monitor research employees, and certain types of defensive patenting. Patent applications
are too costly compared to other signals or other monitoring techniques for the patent
signaling story or the employee monitoring story to justify patenting. These stories each have
merit as derivative sources of patent value. Once a firm decides for some other reason to
patent, then its patent stock could signal information to financial markets, and managers
might decide to use patents as a measure of employee productivity. Commentators use the
term defensive patenting in different ways. According to one version, inventors patent an
invention to prevent a stranger from later inventing and patenting the same invention and
suing the first inventor. We think it must be cheaper to make some other form of disclosure
that would defeat subsequent patent claims. Thus, this type of defensive patenting cannot be
the primary motivation for patenting.
38
Commentators sometimes describe blocked patents as defensive when the underlying
technology is subject to another firm’s patent. In Part III.B.3, we discuss strategic use of
patents by defendants in patent lawsuits. Readers should recognize that an improvement
patent or a new use patent can be used to exclude or license competitors and this source of
profit is distinct from the strategic use of patents to settle litigation.
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outside of the patentee’s industry. This is the main source of patent profit for
universities and independent inventors.39 A third source of profit arises from a
variety of strategic uses of patents in litigation. Certain strategic uses, such as
the use of patents to avoid litigation and facilitate cross-licensing, may be
socially valuable.40 Other strategic uses, including opportunistic and
anticompetitive patent suits based on weak or invalid patents, are clearly
socially harmful.
Survey and stock market research indicates that the patent premium is
greatest in the pharmaceutical industry. These findings match the intuition of
most commentators, who suppose that patents are critical to pharmaceutical
companies that use them to exclude potential competitors.41 For example,
Glynn Lunney Jr. uses event study methodology to examine the reactions of
firm stock prices to court decisions in patent cases. He found pharmaceutical
companies experienced sharp drops in market value after key patents were held
noninfringed or invalid. In one case, Eli Lilly lost nearly 30% of its stock
market value. The evidence of such reactions for firms in other industries was
much weaker, highlighting the importance of exclusion for pharmaceutical
patents.
Contrary evidence comes from renewal and litigation studies, which
suggest that pharmaceutical patents only have average value. Renewal data
shows that pharmaceutical patents rank near the mean in terms of frequency of
renewal;42 similarly, data on lawsuit filing shows pharmaceutical and
biotechnology patents rank near the mean in terms of frequency of filing per
patent.43 We think the conventional wisdom has it right and offer two
explanations for this discrepancy. First, uncertain and skewed patent value is
especially apparent in the pharmaceutical industry. Firms get patents at an early
stage of commercialization, get no value out of most patents, and get a bonanza
from a few. Renewal rates are not especially high as failed drug candidates get
weeded out. Second, litigation rates measured by Allison et al., which do not
39

Commentators note that patents are assets that help start-ups get funding. We agree
but note that this is not an independent source of patent value. Financiers value patents
because of the exclusionary rights they provide.
40
It is possible, however, that the dynamic effect of cross-licensing may reduce R&D
incentives.
41
For example, Allison, Lemley, Moore, and Trunkey are surprised by their finding
that pharmaceutical patents are not litigated more than average patents: “This result seems
quite surprising, given the large amounts of money at stake in pharmaceutical patent suits,
the extensive research and development costs that go into inventions, the comprehensive
lobbying efforts by pharmaceutical manufacturers for technology-specific patent laws, recent
evidence that pharmaceutical companies have violated the antitrust laws in an effort to
extend their patent rights, and prior survey finding pharmaceutical companies consider
patents more important than companies in any other industry.” John R. Allison et al.,
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 474–75 (2004). Mark Lemley suggested to us that their
result may have been skewed because they do not capture end of term suits.
42
Jean Olson Lanjouw, Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation
Estimations of Patent Value, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 671, 678 (1998) (finding payment of
renewal fees correlates with litigation in Germany).
43
Allison et al., supra note 41, at 474–75; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11.
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show high rates in pharmaceuticals, are measuring litigation per patent. In
contrast, our research shows that the chemical industry, SIC code 28, which
includes pharmaceuticals, has the highest rate of litigation per firm of any
industry.44 Our interpretation is that the pharmaceutical industry has a relatively
large number of “dry holes,” but it vigorously protects commercially successful
products through patent litigation.
The semiconductor industry is an interesting contrast to pharmaceuticals,
because surveys of R&D managers do not highly rank patents as a means of
appropriating profit from semi-conductor inventions.45 Nevertheless, the
industry does get a lot of patents, it tends to renew them, and it sees a lot of
patent licensing and litigation.46 The surveys and econometric analysis of
litigation data by Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis suggests that there are two different
types of semiconductor firms that pursue two different strategies for exploiting
their patents. Large, vertically integrated firms tend to cross-license their
patents, while smaller design firms, by necessity, license a manufacturer to
make their chips, but they are litigious and exclusionary toward other industry
members.47
An important goal for future research is to identify more clearly why
patents in the semiconductor industry apparently do not contribute as much to
industry profit as patents in the pharmaceutical industry. Current research hints
that firms can pursue an exclusionary strategy more easily in industries like
pharmaceuticals in which a single firm holds a key patent or a few patents that
cover a product. Patents are harder to exploit in industries like semiconductors,
in which many parties hold patents that cover their own and their competitors’
products.48 Future litigation and licensing research should also provide a better
sense of the frequency with which patents are asserted against industry
competitors as opposed to firms outside of the industry of the patentee.

44

James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion (2004)
(unpublished manuscript at 12, on file with authors).
45
Levin et al., supra note 23, at 784; COHEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 6.
46
Scholars disagree whether litigation rates are high in the semiconductor industry. We
discuss strategic use of patents in the industry and explain infra at text accompanying note
75 why we think the industry has a high rate of litigation.
47
Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology
and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804, 817–818 (2004).
Ziedonis’s data show that litigation is increasing for the vertically integrated firms, and
Bessen & Meurer show that the industry as whole has a high rate of litigation per firm. See
infra text accompanying notes 72–75 for more discussion of patent litigation in the
semiconductor industry.
48
Levin et al., supra note 23, at 798, and several subsequent authors (especially COHEN
ET AL., supra note 23, at 19–23) make a distinction between “discrete” and “complex”
technologies. The former have patents that correspond uniquely (or almost so) with products
and the patents have well-defined boundaries. Below we discuss the strategic use of patents
in the semi-conductor industry to deter litigation. Perhaps semi-conductor firms have a high
propensity to acquire and renew patents for defensive reasons, so “dry holes” don’t really
matter if the patents still pose a potential threat to competitors.
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2. Assignment and Licensing of Non-Competitors
Strategies used to exploit patents depend on the nature of the patentholding entity. Large firms engage in what William Baumol calls “routine
innovation,” a term borrowed from Schumpeter.49 They have relatively
systematic R&D programs that generate inventions and patents directed toward
the industries that the firm participates in. If Baumol is correct, then large firms
normally use their patents to exclude or license their competitors.50 Universities
exploit their patents in quite a different fashion. We suspect and hope that few
or none of their patents relate to the education industry; thus universities gain
most of their profit by licensing and assigning their patents to noncompetitors.51 By definition, two other classes of patent holders exploit their
patents by assignment or licensing of non-competitors: independent inventors
and licensing shops. The story with small firms is mixed. We suspect many
small firms use their patents against competitors to facilitate entry and survival
in their industry. We suspect many other small firms participate in the market
for R&D and license their patents downstream to firms in related industries.52
Assignment and licensing of non-competitors was more significant in the
early American patent system than it is today. Khan and Sokoloff document a
flourishing market for patent rights and a robust class of independent inventors
in the second half of the nineteenth century. The role of the independent
inventor is diminished in the modern economy, in which 71% of patents issue
to large firms.53 We conjecture that the majority of patents held by large firms
and a significant fraction of patents held by small firms are used within the
industries that the firms occupy. If true, then exclusion and licensing of
competitors is the dominant source of patent value. Patent litigation research
can shed light on our conjecture by measuring the fraction of defendants that
are in the same industry as the patentee-plaintiff firm.54
Despite its lower frequency, assignment and licensing of non-competitors
holds great policy interest. Academic and independent inventions possibly have
disproportionately greater social value, and thus merit special attention.55
49

WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE 21, 55 (2002).
No doubt big firms sometimes hold patents relevant to other industries because of the
unpredictable nature of R&D, the coarse linkage between technology and industry, and
shifting product interests of the firms.
51
Universities sometimes participate in faculty based start-ups, and the start-ups may
use patents to exclude or license competitors. Thus, universities indirectly get some profit
from the traditional strategies of excluding or licensing competitors.
52
To recap, we have three categories: independent inventors who do not commercialize
their inventions; small firms that commercialize their patented inventions and use their
patents to exclude or license competitors; and small firms that sell technology (for example,
bio-tech research tools) to downstream firms (pharmaceutical companies).
53
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000).
54
A selection problem must be addressed when interpreting data describing the
industry proximity of plaintiffs and defendants. Perhaps a firm is more likely to file suit
against a non-competing defendant. Repeated interaction is less likely with a noncompetitor, and the threat of patent retaliation might be lower.
55
Allison et al., supra note 41, at 469–70.
50
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Further, independent inventors and small firms are probably more dependent on
the patent premium than other patent holders. Large firms have a wider variety
of methods for extracting value from their inventions and non-profits get
substantial government funding.56 Finally, there is concern that independent
inventors and licensing shops are especially likely to abuse the patent system
by seeking licenses for weak or invalid patents.
Although independent inventors and non-profit inventors capture the
patent premium the same way, they pursue fairly different types of inventions
and patenting and litigation practices. Allison and Lemley find that small
entities tend to patent mostly mechanical inventions and medical instruments.57
Universities, on the other hand, are active across more fields of technology
including biotechnology, electronics, and software, although evidence suggests
that, in fields other than biotechnology, most transfer of technology to the
private sector occurs without patents.58 These numbers may reflect the high
fixed cost of conducting R&D in many fields of technology, which forecloses
participation by independent inventors.59
Following the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, universities have become actively
involved in patenting and licensing their patents. Like other patents, the value
of university patents is highly skewed; only 0.56% of the licenses earned more
than $1 million.60 Overall, universities received more than $1 billion in
licensing royalties and cashed-in equity shares in 2000,61 but this accounted for
only “about 4.7% of their research expenditure.”62
Independent inventors and nonprofit patent holders choose vastly different
litigation strategies. Allison et al. find that small firms and independent
inventors file patent lawsuits about three times as often on a per patent basis as
other patent holders,63 while non-profit patent holders litigate at about the mean
rate for all entities.64 Possibly, small firms and independent inventors litigate
more because their patents are more valuable.65 They could be more valuable
because they cover inventions with higher average quality or because patents
are a more important source of profit to small firms and independent inventors.
Allison et al. cast doubt on the first possibility. They use the number of
56

See Barnett, supra note 23, at 1283.
Allison & Lemley, supra note 53, at 2102.
58
See Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: Exploring
Knowledge Transfer from MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 44 (2002). Furthermore, most university
patent licenses are for early stage ideas that are little more than “proof of concept.” Only
12% were “ready for practical use.” Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University
Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2003).
59
But this does not explain independent inventors’ low rate of patenting software, a
field with many small entities. This may also reflect the greater costs that an independent
inventor or small entity faces in prosecuting and enforcing patents.
60
Thursby & Thursby, supra note 58, at 1052.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Allison et al., supra note 41, at 466.
64
Id. at 466 n.134.
65
Id. at 471.
57
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citations a patent receives from later patents as an indicator of invention
quality. They find that litigated patents on average receive significantly more
citations than non-litigated patents, except in the case of patents held by
independent inventors and small firms.66 The second possibility finds support
from Hall, who obtains evidence that the patent premium is larger for small
firms.67 A third explanation is that large firms resolve disputes more easily
because of reputational or scale advantages.68 Finally, small firms and
independent inventors might engage in more opportunistic litigation. We
comment on this possibility in the next section.
3. Strategic Litigation
Growing evidence suggests that part of the private value created by patents
arises from strategic patent litigation. We use this label to cover three different
patent litigation strategies that depart from the traditional notions of how firms
use patents to create value. First, firms use patents to ward off patent suits by
their competitors. Second, dominant firms threaten or file predatory patent suits
against smaller actual or potential competitors. Third, firms threaten or file
opportunistic patent suits to earn nuisance settlement payments.
Some researchers contend that firms have the power to reduce the
expected cost of patent litigation by building “defensive” patent portfolios.69
This view is supported by survey evidence that many firms do acquire patents
for purposes of trading.70 This theory is typically presented as a variant of the
arms control theory of mutually assured destruction—if you sue me, I will sue
you, and we will enjoin each other. The theory is plausible in industries that
rely on complex technologies that combine many patented components or
features. Other theories can explain why defensive portfolios reduce expected
litigation costs. First, a potential plaintiff would be leery of suing a defendant
with a large patent portfolio because it would have to investigate the portfolio
to estimate the risk of a successful counterclaim. Even if the defendant could
not raise a successful counterclaim, it succeeds in imposing higher litigation
costs on potential plaintiffs. Second, aggressive offensive use of a large
portfolio supports a reputation for being a tough litigator, which can discourage
potential plaintiffs. Third, large portfolios may deter entry and thereby reduce

66
Allison et al. find that forward citations are the strongest predictor of litigation
except for patents assigned to individuals and small entities. Id. at 455.
67
HALL, supra note 36, sec. 2.3. During the 1980–84 period, there was no premium on
patents in the valuation of new firms compared to incumbents, but in the 1985–89 period
there was a significant premium to patents held by entrants in complex product industries.
Id., sec. 3.1.
68
Alternatively, perhaps large firms have more reason than small firms to fear
retaliation in the form of a patent infringement counterclaim; independent inventors have no
such fear. Allison et al., supra note 41, at 469.
69
Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 47 (“[T]his portfolio effect is stronger
for smaller companies, as measured by employment.”).
70
COHEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 17; see Rivette & Kline, supra note 32, at 62
(describing a small chip design company that averted a patent infringement lawsuit by Intel
by purchasing a patent from a bankrupt firm that potentially covered Intel chips).
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the number of potential plaintiffs.71 Fourth, a potential plaintiff with a large
portfolio might join with a defendant with a large portfolio to form a pool to
offer licenses to third parties, thereby gaining from reduced negotiation and
enforcement costs.
The hypothesis that defensive portfolios reduce expected litigation cost is
supported by evidence that rates of litigation per patent decline as portfolio size
grows. It is also supported by evidence that rates of litigation per patent are low
in industries known for active cross-licensing of portfolios of patents covering
entire technology fields, such as electronics and semiconductors.72 For instance,
Allison et al. argue that “[t]he paucity of litigation in the semiconductor
industry is consistent with sector-specific studies of that industry by Hall and
Ziedonis and others and makes perfect sense given the pattern of ‘mutually
assured destruction’ that prevails among established companies in the
industry.”73 Presumably, the pattern of mutually assured destruction leads firms
to settle early in patent litigation to avoid the risk that they will both suffer
adverse infringement or validity judgments.
But new evidence points in the opposite direction. First, the ratio of
litigation per patent can be a misleading measure of the litigation hazard facing
the firm. For example, semiconductor firms both acquire a large number of
patents and engage in a high level of litigation. Ziedonis finds that the rate of
litigation per R&D dollar is quite high in the semiconductor industry, both
among large manufacturing firms and recently entered design firms.74
Moreover, the rate of litigation per real R&D dollar nearly doubled following
the creation of the CAFC. Bessen and Meurer find that the semiconductor
industry has the second highest rate of litigation per firm (after the chemical
industry―including pharmaceuticals).75 Clearly, this high rate of litigation in
semiconductors is offset by an even higher relative rate of patenting compared
to other industries. But the simple fact is that the litigation hazard faced by
firms is quite high. Second, although defensive patenting may lessen a firm’s
71

(1995).
72

Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 486–87

Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 47 (“a larger portfolio of patents reduces
the probability of filing a suit on any individual patent in the portfolio” controlling for
observable characteristics of the patent and patent owner); Allison et al., supra note 41, at
468–69; see Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing
and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1997, at
8.
73
Allison et al., supra note 41, at 474 (citing Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham
Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisted: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S.
Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001)).
74
Ziedonis, supra note 47, at 817–18. In Bronwyn Hall’s latest study of patents and
firm share value she concludes, “[a] preliminary interpretation of these results is the
following: in established firms, accumulating patents for defensive reasons has little impact
on market value because the past history of R&D spending is already a good indicator of the
firm’s technology position. On the other hand, an above average accumulation could be
slightly negative for value if it indicates the [presence] of threatened suits for infringement.”
HALL, supra note 36, sec. 4.
75
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 44, at 12.
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litigation risk, all else equal, when all firms in an industry build defensive
portfolios the net result appears to be greater litigation hazard. Bessen and
Meurer find that two randomly selected firms within a 4-digit SIC industry are
much more likely to engage in litigation with each other if they both have large
portfolios than if they both have small portfolios. Thus, although it is
individually rational for each firm to reduce its litigation risk by building a
defensive portfolio, the collective equilibrium effect is to increase industry
litigation hazards. This suggests that “defensive” patents are not used purely
defensively.
Anti-competitive and opportunistic patent suits are kin to the “normal”
suits that seek exclusion or licensing; they differ because they are based on
“weak” patents—a difference not directly observable to the econometrician.
Anti-competitive suits rely on weak patents to exclude competitors.76
Opportunistic suits rely on weak patents to induce licensing. A patent suit is
weak if the objective probability of successfully proving infringement and
overcoming defenses, such as patent invalidity, is low at the time of filing.
A rational defendant will sometimes yield to the threat of a weak suit for
three main reasons.77 First, court errors are difficult to avoid in patent litigation,
because claim interpretation is complex and it is difficult for fact-finders to
assess evidence of infringement. Thus, a deserving defendant may face a
significant risk of liability.78 Second, a weak lawsuit may be difficult to
distinguish from a strong lawsuit, at least until a defendant gathers information
about the patent through discovery. Finally, even a weak lawsuit may impose
significant costs on the defendant, and the defendant might settle to avoid the
nuisance of mounting a defense.79
Evidence suggestive of anti-competitive patent litigation comes from a
study by Josh Lerner and another by Lerner and Jean O. Lanjouw. Lerner
studies the research programs of bio-tech firms and he finds that small firms
avoid R&D in fields where the threat of litigation from larger firms is high.80
He notes that the rate of litigation per bio-tech patent is very high and that firms
76
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)
(illustrating an anti-competitive patent suit: Food Machinery obtained a patent by
fraudulently concealing a prior use from the PTO; the company was found liable for an
antitrust violation because it attempted to enforce the invalid patent against a competitor);
see also Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. 743 F.2d 1282, 1288–92 (9th Cir. 1984)
(concluding that patentee knew patent was invalid because there was a previous inventor and
because of public use before the patent application).
77
This discussion of opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits is drawn from Michael
J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation,
44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 512–513 (2003).
78
Allison et al., supra note 41, at 475 (observing that the high frequency of lawsuits
per patent among software and computer-related patents is perhaps explained by the
uncertainty of software patent law).
79
See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A
New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
2 (1996).
80
Lerner, supra note 71, at 486–87.
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spend as much on legal fees as they do on R&D. The study does not indicate,
however, that the patents held by the larger firms are low quality. Thus, it is
quite possible that smaller firms are simply looking for less crowded market
niches in which they can compete more profitably.
Lanjouw and Lerner show that preliminary injunctions in patent cases tend
to be used by large firms hoping to impose financial distress on smaller rivals.81
The authors conjecture that preliminary injunctions may be especially harmful
in innovative industries “driven by smaller, more vulnerable, venture-capitalbased firms.”82 Despite the restrictive standard that generally applies to
preliminary injunctions,83 they are relatively common in patent cases.84 They
are useful predatory devices, because small firms face a “particular difficulty of
raising external funds to finance litigation.”85
Despite widespread popular accounts of opportunistic patent suits, hard
evidence is scarce. Two pieces of data provide some hints about the nature of
the problem and whether a problem exists. First, as we mentioned earlier,
independent inventors and small businesses have a very high rate of patent
litigation on a lawsuit per patent basis.86 Popular accounts of opportunistic
litigation suggest that “patent trolls” are usually small firms or independent
inventors. Possibly, opportunistic litigation contributes to the high litigation
rate of small firms and independent inventors.87 It is also possible the high rate
is explained by the importance of patents to these entities.
Second, we searched for all instances of attorney fee-shifting in U.S.
patent cases in the last ten years and found that fees were shifted to the alleged

81
See Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Predatory Use of
Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 575–76 (2001).
82
Id. at 575.
83
See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §2948, 129 (2d ed. 1995) (“It is frequently observed that a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary . . . remedy.”).
84
See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 81, at 595 (noting that preliminary injunctions are
common in patent cases). The Federal Circuit relaxed the standards for preliminary
injunctions in patent cases. Regional circuit courts used to require a showing of validity and
infringement “beyond question.” The Federal Circuit adopted a requirement of likelihood of
validity and infringement for a preliminary injunction. See John G. Mills, The Developing
Standard for Irreparable Harm in Preliminary Injunctions to Prevent Patent Infringement,
81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 51, 55–56 (1999).
85
Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 81, at 574.
86
Barnaby J. Feder, Medtronic Must Pay Inventor $159 Million, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2004, at C6 (noting that Dr. Gary Michelson holds 250 patents and 400 more applications;
he frequently litigates to enforce his patents and is currently embroiled in a suit with
Medtronic over their performance under licenses relating to patents on spinal surgical
devices).
87
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84
B.U. L. Rev. 63, 88–89 (2004) (“Because many submarine patentees are individuals who do
not file abroad, they will not be deterred by the eighteen-month publication rule. Further, our
data show that individual domestic inventors, who are least likely to patent abroad, are the
most common users of the continuation system. There are 854 patents that took twenty years
or longer in prosecution, and 26% of these patents issued to U.S. individuals.”).

18

LEWIS AND CLARK LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9:1

infringer in 25 cases.88 This averages 1% of patent suits that terminated via pretrial motion or trial.89 The reasons given for shifting fees to an alleged infringer
are almost always vexatious litigation, failure to investigate whether
infringement was present, abusive discovery practice, or inequitable conduct.
Thus, these opinions suggest that these cases represent instances of
opportunistic (or anti-competitive) conduct by the patentee. The 1% figure
understates the frequency of abusive litigation for three reasons. First, it is
difficult for alleged infringers to prove the patentee was acting
opportunistically. Second, it may be difficult for alleged infringers to recognize
that they are subject to abusive litigation. Third, presumably, opportunistic
patent litigation often succeeds and alleged infringers settle.
C. How Do Patent Policy Instruments Influence the Patent Premium?

Little empirical work links patent policy instruments to the behavior of
patent applicants, patent litigants, and patent courts. Future work should
strengthen these links and extend them to connect patent reforms to the patent
premium. At the top of our wish list, we would like to see research that links
changes in the non-obviousness doctrine with the behavior of patent applicants,
patent litigants, and ultimately with the magnitude and incidence of the patent
premium. We would like to see similar research tracking changes in claim
interpretation and application of the doctrine of equivalents.90
Empirical researchers have started to look at the impact of policy change
on patent applications, interference proceedings, and trial outcomes. Hall finds
a significant structural break in the time series of U.S. patent applications by
American applicants between 1983 and 1984 (except for computer industry,
which has a break between 1992 and 1993).91 Based on interviews with
industry members, she suggests that the increase in patenting resulted from
successful, high-profile patent suits that convinced businesses that the Federal
Circuit was making patents more valuable.92
There is also direct evidence that the Federal Circuit has changed patent
validity and patent scope. The research must be used cautiously though,
because it does not control for the selection effect. Allison and Lemley find the
88

We counted awards to defendants in infringement actions plus awards to plaintiffs in
declaratory judgment actions during the fiscal years 1994 through 2004.
89
This number is calculated for the five years running from fiscal year 1994 through
fiscal year 1999. During this period fees were shifted to alleged infringers 11 times. The data
on patent case terminations is obtained from the Federal Judicial Center. The data shows the
method of disposition was pre-trial motion in 651 cases and trial in 389 cases, thus the 1%
figure is obtained by dividing 11 by (389 + 651).
90
Glynn Lunney applied stock market event study methodology to Festo and other
leading patent cases and could not find evidence that the market reacts to shifts in patent
doctrine. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A
Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 37–38 (2004).
91
HALL, supra note 36, sec. 2.2.
92
Id. Kortum and Lerner disagree that the recent increase in patent applications can be
explained by the creation of the Federal Circuit. See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, What is
Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? 28 RES. POL’Y 1, 2–3 (1999).
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patent validity rate has increased since the creation of the Federal Circuit.93
Lunney finds that the Federal Circuit is less likely to find infringement than
predecessor courts and thus has narrowed patent scope.94 Wagner and
Petherbridge find Federal Circuit claim interpretation decisions are growing
more predictable.95
Another important strand of empirical work examines whether patent
doctrine has a differential impact on small firms and independent inventors. In
separate studies, Mossinghoff and Lemley and Chien investigated the patent
priority system to see what impact it has on small inventors.96 The first-toinvent system has survived in the U.S. despite pressure to harmonize with the
rest of the world by switching to a first-to-file priority system. These
researchers find small inventors get little, if any, benefit from the American
system. In contrast, Lemley and Moore find that independent inventors
especially benefit from continuation practice, and that continuation practice
continues to be popular despite a variety of recent patent reforms that some
thought would cause the number of continuation applications to decline.97
93

Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 194 (“[Study of] 299 patents litigated in 239
different cases. These cases represent all written, final validity decisions by either district
courts or the Federal Circuit reported in the U.S.P.Q. during an almost eight-year period
from early 1989 through 1996.”); id. at 206 (noting the validity rate has increased since the
creation of the Federal Circuit); id. at 205 (noting that 54% of patents are found valid); see
also Lunney, supra note 90.
94
Lunney, supra, note 90, at 11–12 (finding patent owners succeed about 30% of the
time at the Federal Circuit and suggesting the availability of injunctive relief explains the
departure from a 50% success rate); id. at 14 (finding that the Federal Circuit is less likely
than predecessor courts to invalidate a patent, but also less likely to find infringement, and
thus, no more likely to find in favor of a patent owner); id. at 15 (“In the pre-Federal Circuit
era, a ruling that the patent claim(s) at issue was invalid due to obviousness accounted for
64.8% of the failure results. In contrast, under the Federal Circuit, a failure to satisfy the
nonobviousness requirement accounted for only 14.6% of the failure results.”); see also
Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’
Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 130 (2001) (noting that one-fifth of federal civil,
non-personal injury tort, and contract cases are appealed, and one-fifth of the appeals led to a
reversal).
95
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1156 (2004).
96
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage
to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425, 426 (2002); Mark A. Lemley &
Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary? 54 HASTINGS L.J.
1299, 1300 (2003).
97
Lemley & Moore, supra note 87, at 65 (“Congress and the courts have created a
number of patent doctrines designed to combat the misuse of continuation applications. In
the last ten years, they have changed the term of patents, ended the secrecy of most patent
applications, revived the controversial doctrine of written description, and created an entirely
new defense of prosecution laches. While these changes have indeed mitigated some of the
worst abuses of the continuation process, our data demonstrate that they are not likely to be
effective in tackling the core of the problem.”); id. at 69 (“The results of our comprehensive
study of patent continuations shows that 23% of all patents granted from 1976 through 2000
claim priority to one or more previously filed applications.”); id. (“Although there has been
some fluctuation over the years in the number of continuation patents filed, the trend has
been a steady increase. In the mid-1970s, about one-fifth of all issued patents were based on
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IV. PATENT PROSECUTION

A. The Endogenous Nature of Patent Scope and Validity

Research shows that litigated patents differ significantly from non-litigated
patents. For example, litigated patents have more claims, more citations to prior
art, and are more likely to be part of a family of patents claiming priority from
a common predecessor.98 Research also documents the growing complexity of
patents. The number of claims, number of prior art citations, and prosecution
time have all grown rapidly.99 These results raise the question of how much
control patent prosecutors have over the scope and validity of patents. Perhaps
litigated patents differ from non-litigated patents because patent applicants
recognize which patents are most likely to be litigated and therefore invest
more effort in prosecuting those patents.100 Perhaps patents have grown more
complex because most applicants face an elevated probability of litigation or a
higher expected return from their patents and this drives increased investment
in prosecution of all of their patent applications.101
Patent applicants can refine their patents in a variety of ways. First, they
can conduct better prior art searches, and then draft better claims to avoid
troublesome prior art. Incidentally, the duty to disclose material prior art may
lead to more citations to prior art for firms who search the prior art more
continuations. By the mid-1990s the number of patents issued based on continuation
applications climbed to 31%. That number has declined somewhat in the last several years,
in part because of changes in the way patent term is calculated, but continuation patents still
constitute about one-quarter of all issued patents.”).
98
See Allison et al., supra note 41, at 456–457 (“Patent applicants whose patents were
ultimately litigated filed many more continuation applications than ordinary applicants.”); id.
at 457 (“Litigated patents also tended to be part of ‘families’ of issued patents.”); id. at 459
(“Litigated patents also spent significantly longer in prosecution than issued patents [using
grant year–filing year].”); id. (“For this reason, time in prosecution was not a significant
predictor of litigation in the multivariate regression in the sample study once we controlled
for [the number of patent applications filed].”).
99
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the U.S. Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002).
100
Lemley & Moore, supra note 87, at 65 (“[C]ontinuation practice can be―and has
been―used strategically to gain advantages over competitors by waiting to see what product
the competitor will make, and then drafting patent claims specifically designed to cover that
product. Finally, some patentees have used continuation practice to delay the issuance of
their patent precisely in order to surprise a mature industry, a process known as ‘submarine
patenting.’”).
101
Allison & Lemley, supra note 99, at 139–141; id. at 81 (“W]e speculate on
explanations for the dramatic increase in the complexity of patents. We reject a number of
possible explanations, including both changes in the quality of PTO examination and
changes in the nature of technology, as inconsistent with the data. The hypothesis that best
fits the data is that patents are increasingly valuable to businesses, and that companies that
expect to use patents in licensing or litigation are willing to spend more time and effort in the
PTO to get a better patent.”); Allison et al., supra note 41, at 455 (noting that patent
applicants file more claims and cite more prior art to increase the value of their patents in
litigation).
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diligently.102 Second, they can refine the claim language. Better drafted claims
may have greater scope, and they may better anticipate technological
developments or invent-around possibilities. Also, carefully nested claims may
be more resistant to invalidation, providing better odds that the relevant claim
will survive invalidation of more general claims.103 Third, they can put more
effort into enabling research and drafting the written description. Finally, patent
applicants can delay prosecution and observe activities of potential infringers
and complementary developments in technology. This enables them to write
claim language that literally “reads on” infringers’ technology, including laterdeveloped technology.
Possibly, prosecutors are best described as passive rather than strategic,
i.e., their actions are dictated by the nature of the invention, the requirements of
patent law, and the whims of the examiner.104 The high level of refinement of
litigated patents could be explained by technology—valuable inventions are
more likely to be litigated, and they feature complex technology that requires
extensive patent refinement. The trend toward increasingly complex patents
could also be explained by increasingly complex technology or rigorous patent
examination. For example, continuations are filed most often in the
biotechnology and chemical fields.105 Perhaps this occurs because patents in
these fields tend to be complicated, or perhaps this occurs because these
industries value patents more highly than other industries.
We conducted some exploratory regressions that suggest that the number
of claims and the number of citations to patent prior art are both determined in
part by characteristics of the applicant.106 We find that citations and claims are
positively correlated with the applicants’ cash flow and capital intensity. We
find that large firms, foreign firms, and firms with large patent portfolios refine
less after controlling for other factors. These preliminary findings suggest that

102
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 231 (noting that amount of prior art cited is not
correlated with validity); id. at 234 (noting that uncited prior art is more helpful than cited
prior art in invalidating a patent); id. at 227–28 (observing that courts rarely disaggregate
claims and there might not be much value at trial to owning a patent with elaborately nested
claims); id. at 230–31 (noting that one is unable to establish significant relationship between
number of backward citations and finding of validity); id. at 239 (finding no significant
relationship between validity and time in prosecution or time between issuance and the final
determination of validity); id. at 232–34 (citing evidence that non-cited prior art is more
likely to be used to invalidate a patent on novelty or obviousness grounds). This evidence
does not make a very strong case that including more backward cites causes the patent to be
stronger. Instead, it suggests that when a bad prior art search leads to sloppy claim drafting
patentees get surprised at trial. Further, some patentees perhaps hope the prior art the PTO
did not find will not be found by the defendant.
103
It is not clear that a more refined patent should have more claims.
104
Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
151, 155 (2004) (presenting empirical evidence that examiners vary widely in terms of the
changes in claim language in patents they examine).
105
Lemley & Moore, supra note 87, at 85–86.
106
The data set is described in Bessen & Meurer, supra note 44. The regression results
are available from the authors.
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market factors, as well as legal and technical factors, determine effort to refine
patents.107
B. Reforms to Improve Patent Office Performance

Popular and academic commentators have proposed a variety of Patent
Office reforms in the wake of complaints about the low quality of patent
examination. Mark Lemley observed that agency resources for patent
examination are limited, the average patent gets only 18 hours of review, and
thus, examination offers little more than a quick look at most patents.108 Severe
limits on Patent Office resources, combined with recognition that most patents
turn out to have no economic value, push commentators to recommend that the
Patent Office prioritize patent applications and spend more effort reviewing
patents that are most likely to be valuable.109
Empirical research suggests that information useful for prioritization may
come from three sources: characteristics of litigated patents; characteristics of
patents that are renewed; and other empirical research on sources of the patent
premium. Research on litigation and renewal offers a fairly consistent view
about the characteristics of important patents. Patent renewal and litigation are
both positively correlated with the number of claims, the amount of prior art
cited, the number of patent applications that share a common ancestor, and the
number of citations subsequently received.110 Stock market, survey, litigation
and renewal research all suggest that patents are especially important in certain
industries.

107
Further evidence comes from studies that show litigation is more likely to occur
when patents are young, and patented technology is old. Allison et al., supra note 41, at 445;
id. at 462 n.114 (“Prior studies of patent litigation show that it takes over twelve years on
average from the time a patent application is filed to the time litigation is completed.”);
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 237 (“[I]t appears that most patents litigated to judgment
involve fairly old technology.”). These findings are consistent with the view that certain
patents are cultivated in the Patent Office by applicants who are preparing for patent
litigation.
108
See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1500 (2001).
109
Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 597 (1999); Allison et al., supra note 41, at 463 (arguing that if
the patent value theory is correct, the PTO is devoting its resources in the right manner by
disproportionately spending its time examining the most valuable patents).
110
Allison et. al., supra note 41, at 449; id. at 451 (noting that litigated patents include
significantly more claims than issued patents); id. at 453 (noting that litigated patents also
cite significantly more prior art than issued patents, and that patents that end up being
litigated are much more likely to be cited as prior art by other issued U.S. patents than are
non-litigated patents); Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 45 (2004); Jean O.
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on
Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 140 (2001); MOORE, supra note 6, at 15, tbl. 1 (2004)
(noting expired patents had fewer claims, cited fewer U.S. patents, received fewer cites
(most dramatic 7.13 vs. 4.73), listed fewer inventors (2.14 vs. 1.96), and had fewer related
applications).
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Examination reform might follow the example set by the “second pair of
eyes” policy recently implemented by the PTO to improve the quality of
business method patents. The PTO devotes extra examination effort to patent
applications assigned to Class 705, a class with many business method patents
relating to data processing. For example, the PTO might devote extra
examination effort to patent applications that contain a large number of claims,
a large number of citations, or come from a large family of co-pending
applications. Of course, examination priorities cannot be based on number of
citations received. Instead, it might be possible to enact a “mid-life” review of
highly cited patents, for example, by giving the competition authorities (FTC,
Antitrust Division of DOJ) or the PTO the authority and resources to review
and modify patents that are too broad or too narrow. Finally, reform might
target patents in certain industries or technologies for more intense scrutiny, as
exemplified by the “second pair of eyes” policy.
Although prioritizing examination seems attractive, the proposals listed
above face two serious problems. The first and simplest is evasion. Allison and
Hunter find patent applicants have had significant success evading the “second
pair of eyes” review by writing patent applications in a way that avoids Class
705.111 Similarly, applicants may alter their prosecution strategies to avoid the
other reforms mentioned above. For example, review triggered by the number
of claims might induce applicants to file for more patents containing fewer
claims.
Second, the statistics mentioned above all correlate with private patent
value, but maximizing social value is the appropriate goal for patent reform.
Thus, we must consider whether private patent value is likely to correlate with
social value. Citations received indicate social value, assuming that the pioneer
status of an invention explains why its patent is highly cited.112 It is also
possible that a patent receives a lot of citations simply because it is in a
crowded art. Subsequent patents might cite earlier patents simply to distinguish
them, and not because they build on them.113 The link between number of
111
See John Allison & Starling Hunter, A Non-Solution to a Non-Problem (2004)
(working paper on file with authors, available at http://www.utexas/edu.depts/bbr/rnews/
2004/allison/htm).
112
We examined a list of 33 patents awarded after 1962 and listed in the National
Inventors Hall of Fame. We compared their characteristics (number of citations made and
received and number of claims) to the mean values of those characteristics for the grant year.
We found that the famous patents receive significantly more citations, but they do not have
significantly more claims and they make significantly fewer citations. The magnitude of the
difference in citations received is not that large and was driven by a few patents like the PCR
patent that got the lion’s share of citations. Our result is consistent with Dietmar Harhoff et
al., Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 511,
515 (1999) (looking at a sample of “successful” German patents and finding they receive
more citations, but not that much more); see also Allison et al., supra note 41, at 440 (“[O]ne
reason that citations received . . . may correlate so highly with litigation is that such patents
were early entrants in a field now crowded with competitors.”).
113
IAIN M. COCKBURN ET AL., ARE ALL PATENT EXAMINERS EQUAL? THE IMPACT OF
CHARACTERISTICS ON PATENT STATISTICS AND LITIGATION OUTCOMES 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8980, 2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8980 (“[A]
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claims, number of prior art citations, and social value is also debatable.114
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of this approach is that litigation
involves social costs that might be reduced if the patents most likely to be
litigated are improved by more thorough examination.
V. THE SOCIAL COST OF PATENT LITIGATION

Parts III and IV discussed lessons from empirical research on patent
litigation for patent law and regulation. Part V shifts attention to the social
burden created by patent litigation. We put core patent policy goals aside and
look instead at traditional questions from the economics of civil procedure,
such as, how can we encourage settlement and minimize the expected social
cost from patent litigation?
We start by examining trends in patent litigation. The rate of filing has
doubled in the last 10 years.115 Furthermore, Bessen and Meurer find that the
annual patent litigation hazard for a publicly traded firm has grown from about
25% in 1987 to about 46% in 1999.116 Assuming the average cost associated
with a filing is constant over time, this trend indicates an increasing burden
from litigation. If the average cost is also growing then the burden is even
larger.117 Stepping back, the social harm from this increased burden might be
less troubling when we take into account the increased rate of patenting. In fact,
Lanjouw and Schankerman argue that when we account for the increased
propensity to patent in more litigious fields, the propensity to litigate on a per

significant portion of the overall variance among patents in measures such as the number and
pattern of citations received, the number and pattern of citations made, and the approval time
can be explained by the identity of the examiner.”); id. at 3 (“[T]here is a significant positive
relationship between the citations received by a subsequently litigated patent and the
‘propensity’ of its examiner to issue patents that attract a large number[] of citations.”); id.
(“Although the outcome of a test of validity by the CAFC is unrelated to the number of
citations received by that particular patent, validity is strongly related to the portion of the
citation rate explained by the examiner’s idiosyncratic propensity to issue patents which
receive a high level of citations. To the extent that the examiner-specific citation rate reflects
the ‘generosity’ of examiners in allowing claims, our empirical findings suggest that one of
the roles of the CAFC is to review the discretion exercised in the patent examination
process.”).
114
We discovered that the famous patents have significantly fewer prior art citations.
For a similar finding, see Allison et al., supra note 41, at 452. (“[T]he number of claims
bears no necessary relation to the breadth of a patent. Indeed, if anything the relationship
should be inverse―the closer the patent is to the prior art, and therefore the narrower it is,
the more claims a patentee may draft in order to help preserve the patent’s validity.”).
115
Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that the number of patent
suits in the last two decades rose almost tenfold).
116
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 44, at 18.
117
We do not have a good measure of patent litigation costs. Ideally, we would like to
know the sum of payments to law firms, the opportunity costs associated with the effort
devoted to litigation by managers and in-house attorneys, and costs from delay and
uncertainty created by litigation.
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patent basis is essentially constant.118 But patent enforcement costs are only
part of the story. It is possible that increasing litigation imposes an increasing
burden on innovators who cannot avoid the growing maze of patents and
ambitions of patent owners. Bessen and Meurer find that the ratio of the hazard
of being an alleged infringer to real R&D expenditures rose 61% from 1987 to
1999 among public companies.119 Regardless of whether the social burden from
patent litigation is growing, commentators agree that it is large compared to
other types of civil litigation.120
The Federal Circuit has been active in reforming patent trial procedures,
but there is not much evidence that it has improved the efficiency of patent
trials. The court has been criticized for creating uncertainty about claim
interpretation121 and for failing to create national uniformity in patent trials.
Kimberly Moore shows that forum shopping continues to be a significant
problem in patent litigation.122 The advantages of choosing the best forum put
pressure on the parties to file a lawsuit; the patent holder might fear an alleged
infringer will gain a forum selection123 advantage by filing a declaratory
118
Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that increase is mostly
explained by the increase in the number of patents issued, and a shift of patents to
technology fields that are more litigious).
119
Ziedonis finds that litigation per dollar spent on R&D has increased in the
semiconductor industry. Ziedonis, supra note 47, at 816.
120
Studies of patent litigation estimate that plaintiffs plus defendants lose 2–3% of their
market value upon announcement of patent lawsuit filing. See Lerner, supra note 71; Sanjai
Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence from
Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 223 (1994).
121
Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (“Of the 179 cases that involved an
express review of claim construction, the Federal Circuit modified claim interpretations in
78 cases, or 44% of the total, during the twenty-eight months covered by this study. Further,
53 out of these 78 cases (68%) were reversed on the basis of claim construction. In sum, the
Federal Circuit reversed 29.6% of cases involving an express review of claim
construction.”); Moore, Patent Cases, supra note 4, at 2–3 (“In the absence of a route for
expedited appeal of claim construction, district courts are forced to proceed with lengthy and
expensive patent litigation based on their frequently erroneous claim construction.”); see
Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New Evidence
Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 126 (1999) (finding
uncertainty lowest in IP suits).
122
Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001) (“The empirical results presented in this
Article demonstrate that despite the creation of the Federal Circuit, choice of forum
continues to play a critical role in the outcome of patent litigation.”).
123
See id. at 920 (“In cases in which the defendant was able to choose the forum (as
with declaratory judgment actions) rather than the patent holder (as in infringement suits),
there was a significant difference in outcome: the defendant is much more likely to win
when it selects the forum.”); Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 368 (“Juries are
significantly pro-patentee in suits for infringement (68% patentee win rate). But when a
possible infringer initiates a declaratory judgment action, the patentee only has a 38% win
rate. If the same were true of judges, then one could attribute the difference in win rate to the
strength of the cases―namely, that alleged infringers only bring declaratory judgment suits
when they have strong cases. But patentee win rates are substantially uniform in bench trials,
regardless of who initiated the suit.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?,
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judgment suit.124 Besides pushing the patent holder to file earlier than it would
have otherwise, the threat of a declaratory judgment suit may chill settlement
negotiations in advance of filing suit.125
The Federal Circuit’s treatment of the role of the jury in patent trials has
achieved mixed results. On one hand, the power of the jury has been reduced
by the decision to make claim construction a question of law.126 But on the
other hand, the frequency of jury trials has soared.127 This is problematic
because jury trials are more expensive and take longer than bench trials.128 And
patent juries display a pronounced bias in favor of inventors129 and against
foreigners.130 The Seventh Amendment jury trial right prevents the United
States from mimicking the rest of the world and abolishing jury trials in patent
cases. Therefore, further progress mitigating problems with jury trials will be
difficult.
VI. CONCLUSION

Empirical research reveals the patent system has widely varying effects
across different industries. It provides critical incentives for research and
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 859–60 (2002) [hereinafter Moore, Jury Demands] (“Figure 4
shows that the patent holder’s jury demand rate rose to 76% after isolating those cases in
which the patent holder initiated suit. By contrast, when the patent holder is the defendant
(i.e., when the accused infringer initiates the lawsuit by filing a declaratory judgment action),
the patent holder demanded a jury in 53% of the cases.”).
124
See Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 381 (noting that 14% of patent trials are
declaratory judgments).
125
The reasonable apprehension of suit is a precondition to a declaratory judgment.
See Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
126
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
127
Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 211 (noting that in 1978 only 8.3% of patent
trials were tried to a jury, but by 1994, jury trials accounted for 70% of all patent trials); id.
at 213 (noting that juries more likely to hold a patent valid than judges); Moore, Black Box,
supra note 7, at 366 (finding that jury trials in patent cases have risen from 2.6% in 1970 to
62% in 1999).
128
See Moore, Jury Demands, supra note 123, at 857.
129
See Moore, Black Box, supra note 7, at 368 (“For example, juries are significantly
more likely to find patents valid, infringed, and willfully infringed than judges.”); id. at 386
(“When the jury is the adjudicator, the patent holder prevails in 63% of all claims and 68%
of all suits. When the judge is the adjudicator, the patent holder succeeds in 49% of all
claims and 51% of all suits.”).
130
Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497,
1504 (2003) (“Domestic parties win 64% of cases tried to juries in which the adversary is
foreign; foreign parties win the remaining 36% of such cases. However, there is no
significant difference in win rates for foreign and domestic parties when judges
adjudicate.”); see id. at 1504–05 (“Although foreign inventors acquire 45% of patent rights
annually, they seek to enforce their patent rights in only 13% of the litigated cases.”);
MOORE,
supra
note
6,
at
14–15,
tbl.1,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=566941 (showing no difference in
foreign inventor vs. American inventor maintenance); id. at 19–20, tbl.2 (noting that U.S.
corporations are slightly more likely to renew than foreign corporations, but that foreign
corporations are more likely to maintain than U.S. corporations).
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development in the pharmaceutical and a few other industries. In most
industries, it provides a relatively small incentive. Ideally, patent policy should
be tailored to reflect these industry differences.131 Patent law should be mindful
of the various sources of patent-based profit. Certain strategic uses of patents
are socially harmful; more empirical research is needed to quantify the social
loss from anti-competitive and opportunistic patent litigation, and guide
policies that will discourage anti-social litigation. Finally, more research is
needed to identify when patent disputes will degenerate into lawsuits. This
research is needed to guide reforms designed to contain the apparently high and
growing social cost from patent litigation.

131
For a thoughtful discussion of industry-specific patent policy, see Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003).

